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ALLEN LEUNG and FRANCIS LOPEZ-REAL 
 
THEOREM JUSTIFICATION AND ACQUISITION IN DYNAMIC 
GEOMETRY: A CASE OF PROOF BY CONTRADICTION 
 
 
ABSTRACT.   Theorem acquisition and deductive proof have always been core elements in the 
study and teaching of Euclidean geometry. The introduction of dynamic geometry environments, 
DGE (e.g. Cabri-Géomètre, Geometer's Sketchpad), into classrooms in the past decade has posed 
a challenge to this praxis. Students can experiment through different dragging modalities on 
geometrical objects that they construct, and consequently infer properties (generalities, theorems) 
about the geometrical artifacts. Because of the inductive nature of the DGE, the experimental-
theoretical gap that exists in the acquisition and justification of geometrical knowledge becomes 
an important pedagogical and epistemological concern. In this paper, we will describe and study a 
‘Cabri proof by contradiction’ of a theorem on cyclic quadrilaterals given by a pair of 16 year-old 
students in a Hong Kong secondary school. We will discuss how their construction motivates a 
visual-cognitive scheme on ‘seeing’ proof in DGE, and how this scheme could fit into the 
theoretical construct of cognitive unity of theorems proposed by Boero, Garuti and Mariotti 
(1996). The issue of a cognitive duality and its relation to visualization will be raised and 
discussed. Finally, we propose a possible perspective to bridge the experimental-theoretical gap 
in DGE by introducing the idea of a dynamic template as a visualizer to geometrical theorem 
justification and acquisition. 
 
KEY WORDS:  dynamic geometry, proof, justification, visualization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Theorem acquisition and proof have traditionally been at the heart of the study and 
teaching of Euclidean geometry. In our mathematical culture, Euclidean geometry has 
been regarded as a formal system and proofs in it are deductive in nature. A geometrical 
theorem or statement is justified by deducing it from known theorems and axioms in 
manners that are consistent with a formal axiomatic system. This has given rise to a 
tradition in which the teaching of Euclidean geometry is largely about teaching deductive 
reasoning by means of proving theorems. However, the introduction of dynamic 
geometry environments, DGE (e.g. Cabri-Géomètre, Geometer's Sketchpad), into the 
classrooms in the past decade has posed a challenge to this praxis (see, for example, 
Chazan, 1993; Hölzl, 1996; Noss & Hoyles, 1996; King & Schattschneider, 1997; 
Mariotti & Bartolini Bussi, 1998). In a dynamic geometry environment, teacher and 
students can experiment through different dragging modalities on geometrical objects that 
they have constructed, and consequently infer properties (generalities, theorems) about 
the geometrical artifacts. The ideal synthetic view of Euclidean geometry is approximated 
by a computer model that might consequently give rise to a different geometry and 
suggest new styles of reasoning: 
 
“…dynamic geometry should not be treated as if it is merely a new interface to Euclidean 
construction. Line segments that stretch and points that move relative to each other are 
not trivially the same objects that one treats in the familiar synthetic geometry, and this 
suggests new styles of reasoning.” (Goldenberg 1995, p.220) 
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On the one hand, this possible new geometry is shaped by anomalies due to 
‘computational transposition’ (Balacheff 1993) from abstract idealism to concrete 
computational graphic images, while on the other hand it has evolved from pedagogical 
rationales.   
  
“Cabri’s drag-mode may be axiomatically neutral but certainly not heuristically neutral. 
Thus, dragging suggest new styles of consideration and reasoning which are in a way 
characteristic of Cabri geometry…..not in an axiomatic sense but in a didactic one.” 
(Hölzl, 1996, p.177) 
 
Drag-mode in dynamic geometry seems to be a kernel that is potent with rich didactic 
possibilities. Studies have been conducted to investigate the effect of different dragging 
behaviours of students. Hölzl observed that some students favored a “drag & link” 
strategy and did not “simply want to fix a solution but to create new knowledge” (Hölzl, 
1996, p.182). Arzarello, Micheletti, Olivero and Robutti (1998) analysed the types of 
dragging strategy (wandering dragging, dragging test, lieu meut dragging) that students 
employed in arriving at correspondingly different conjectural statements for an open 
geometrical problem.  Leung and Lopez-Real (2000) analysed students’ Cabri solutions 
to a geometrical construction problem and proposed a dragging scheme that could have 
guided them through their Cabri exploration. This dragging scheme seemed to open up a 
‘zone of proximal solutions’ (to paraphrase Vygotsky, 1978) between the students and 
the Cabri environment in which insight and understanding could be developed via open 
investigation and experimentation (Leung & Lopez-Real, 2000, p.150). Arzarello (2000) 
Postprint 
 4 
further commented on students’ dragging ‘tempos’ (slow-fast) that seems to reflect a 
synchronization between visual perception and cognition, and hence suggested that “a 
conscious use of dragging…..can support the subject in the processes of generating 
generalities.” (Arzarello, 2000, p.29)  
 
When this empirical and inductive dimension is to be added to a pedagogical structure 
that is traditionally rooted in deductive logic, careful examination is needed on how to 
combine these two seemingly opposite perspectives: that is, to deal with acquisition and 
justification (proof) of geometrical knowledge in a pedagogical situation embedded in a 
DGE. The passage from ‘intuitive’ geometry to ‘theoretical’ geometry in the evolution of 
a justification in a proof is neither simple nor spontaneous. The possibility of modifying 
the system of relations among statements in geometrical knowledge mediated by DGE is 
entertained by educational researchers (see for example, Mariotti, 1997).  Hoyles and 
Healy (1999) investigated how visual reasoning using Cabri, in particular through robust 
and soft construction, can motivate students to explain their empirical conjectures using 
formal proof. Their findings indicated that there is a disparity in students’ perceptions 
between Cabri constructions and Euclidean formal proofs.  
 
“… Cabri-Géomètre helps students in defining and identifying geometrical properties and 
the dependencies between them, but not in proving them…after starting on the writing of 
the proof, the computer interactions were suspended” (Healy, 2000, p.114).  
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A connection seems to be missing to bridge the empirical and the theoretical cognitive 
domains. This breach may be due to the traditional teaching emphasis on accepting 
something is true (T) only if it can be proved (P) (i.e. P⇒  T). Students might see the 
proof of a theorem (hence accepting the truth of it) as independent from exploratory 
activities in which the content of the theorem can be experimentally verified. However, 
deVilliers has argued that “in actual mathematical research, the forward implication (T⇒  
P), ……..often plays a far greater role [in conjecturing and proving] in motivating and 
guiding our action” (de Villiers, 1997, p.20). It is the conviction that something is true 
that drives us to seek a proof. In DGE, we can easily be convinced of:  
 
“the general validity of a conjecture by seeing its truth displayed while objects undergo 
continuous transformation across the screen [but] this provides no personally satisfactory 
explanation of why it may be true. … There is no insight or understanding into how it is 
the consequence of other familiar results”  (de Villiers, 1997, p.22).  
 
Boero, Garuti, Lemut and Mariotti (Garuti et al, 1996; Boero et al, 1996; Mariotti et al, 
1997; Garuti et al, 1998; Boero et al, 1999) conducted a body of research into students’ 
behaviour in the linkage between the process of producing conjectures (or generating 
conditionality of statements) and the process of proving theorems.  In particular, Boero et 
al proposed a hypothesis on conjecture production as follows: 
 
“the conditionality of the statement can (authors’ emphasis) be the product of a dynamic 
exploration of the problem situation during which the identification of a special regularity 
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leads to a temporal section of the exploration process, that will be subsequently detached 
from it and then “crystallize” from a logic point of view (“if….., then…..”)” (Boero et al, 
1996, p.121). 
 
The transformation from detachment to crystallization seems to be a critical process that 
could bridge the intuitive-formal epistemological gap.  Harel used the term 
“transformational proof scheme” to describe such a process when “students’ justifications 
attend to the generality aspects of a conjecture and involve mental operations that are 
goal oriented and intended-anticipatory” (Harel, 1996, p.62). A theoretical construct 
called the cognitive unity of theorems was proposed (Garuti et al, 1996; Mariotti et al, 
1997) as an attempt to fill the cognitive gap between empirical postulation and formal 
reasoning. It is expressed in the following terms: 
 
"during the production of the conjecture, the student progressively works out his/her 
statement through an intensive argumentative activity functionally intermingled with the 
justification of the plausibility of his/her choices. During the subsequent statement-
proving stage, the student links up with this process in a coherent way, organizing some 
of the previously produced arguments according to a logical chain." (Garuti et al, 1998, 
p.345) 
 
In DGE, intensive argumentative activities involve intelligent interaction between 
students and a virtual microworld. Instead of visual activities in DGE that focus mainly 
on empirical verification (evidence), we should seek to design structured activities that 
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may lead to formation of conjectures and have the potential to bring about insight and 
understanding. These structured conjecture-forming activities in DGE should generate an 
argumentative reasoning process, like that of Simon's (1996) "transformational 
reasoning". 
 
"Transformational reasoning is the mental or physical enactment of an operation or set of 
operations on an object or set of objects that allows one to envision the transformations 
that these objects undergo and the set of results of these operations. Central to 
transformational reasoning is the ability to consider, not a static state, but a dynamic 
process by which a new state or a continuum of states are generated."  (Simon, 1996, 
p.201) 
 
He goes on to suggest that: 
 
"…..transformational reasoning is a natural inclination of the human learner who seeks to 
understand and to validate mathematical ideas. [It] involves envisioning the 
transformation of a mathematical situation and the results of that transformation. The 
affective consequence of transformational reasoning is often a sense of understanding 
how it works." (Simon, 1996, p.207) 
 
DGE fits naturally with transformational reasoning because in it a figural continuum of 
geometrical states can be visually generated.  This genre of reasoning mediates (or is a 
hybrid) between inductive and deductive reasoning and  “may not only produce a 
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different way of thinking about mathematical situations, it may also involve a different 
set of questions” (Simon, 1996, p.203). Furthermore, mathematical understanding may be 
achieved through a “realization of the appropriateness” (Simon, 1996, p.203) of a 
dynamic argumentative process (conducted through transformational reasoning) situated 
in a particular geometrical context.  In DGE, the objects upon which transformational 
reasoning acts usually possess a dual nature. On the one hand they are spatial figures 
(drawings) depicted on the computer screen while on the other hand, when properly 
constructed, they represent ideal geometrical concepts that are formally constrained under 
an axiomatic system. This duality was the essence of Fischbien’s theory of figural 
concepts: 
 
“In this symbiosis between concept and figure, as it is revealed in geometrical entities, it 
is the image component which stimulates new directions of thought, but there are the 
logical, conceptual constraints which control the formal rigour of the process.” 
(Fischbein, 1993, p.139) 
 
Hence figural concepts are holistic cognitive structures that embrace the simultaneous 
interpretation of sensorial images (figural properties) and abstract symbolic constraints 
(conceptual properties) of geometrical entities. They “constitute only the ideal limit of a 
process of fusion and integration between the logical and the figural facets” (Fischbein, 
1993, p.150).  
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In summary, we outline a possible framework on theorem acquisition and justification in 
DGE: 
 
Theorem acquisition and justification in DGE is a schematic cognitive-visual dual 
process potent with structured conjecture-forming activities, in which dynamic visual 
explorations through different dragging modalities are applied on geometrical entities. 
These activities stimulate argumentative/transformational reasoning, which enables the 
process to converge towards integrated figural concepts that could bring about formal 
mathematical proofs, hence producing a cognitive unity in acquiring and proving 
geometrical theorems. 
 
The focus of the above framework is on the epistemic (i.e. knowledge producing) process 
that brings about the security of an ‘integrated knowledge’, rather than the formulation of 
a ‘rational proof’. Rodd (2000) distinguishes justification (formal proof) and warrant as 
“rationale for a belief” and “that which secures knowledge” respectively. She argued 
philosophically that “proof does not always warrant, and a warrant may be other than a 
proof”. In particular, she discussed the issue of visualization as a mathematical warrant in 
the context of DGE. In this sense, our framework on theorem acquisition and justification 
in DGE is about a warrant on geometrical theorems. This warrant embodies what Rota 
called “the exchangeability of theorem and proof” (Rota, 1997, p.190).  In brief, this 
refers to a common phenomenon in research mathematics, in which during the process of 
developing a proof for a particular theorem, new significant mathematical possibilities 
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often arise, which sometimes even overshadow the original intended theorem.  Rota 
proposed that: 
 
“a rigorous version of the notion of possibility be added to the formal baggage of 
metamathematics….A realistic look at the development of mathematics shows that the 
reasons for a theorem are found only after digging deep and focusing upon the 
possibilities of the theorem.” (Rota, 1997, p.191) 
 
Hanna & Jahnke (1993) also called for a shift to a pragmatic view of proof in which 
meaning, new aspects of the theorems proved, and potentiality for future applications are 
emphasied rather than merely the logical deduction of a formal proof.  In the light of this 
open approach to mathematics, the visual dynamic nature of DGE makes DGE an ideal 
laboratory to explore the richness of geometrical knowledge, in particular, the nature of 
geometrical theorems.  
  
In this paper, we will first describe and analyse a case of “Cabri proof by contradiction” 
of a theorem on cyclic quadrilaterals given by a pair of 16 year-old students in a Hong 
Kong secondary school. We will then discuss how their construction motivated us to 
begin to put together a scheme for “seeing” proof by contradiction in DGE, and to discuss 
how this scheme could fit into our framework. The issue of a cognitive duality and its 
relation to visualization will be discussed, and we will propose a possible perspective to 
bridge the experimental-theoretical gap in DGE by introducing the idea of a dynamic 
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template as a visualizer to geometrical theorem justification and acquisition. Finally, we 
will point out two directions of research implied by our proposed scheme. 
 
 
A CASE STUDY 
Background 
Hilda and Jane were Form 4 (Grade 10) students in a band one secondary school in Hong 
Kong. (Hong Kong’s secondary schools are streamed according to students’ ability. A 
band one school is for the most able students.) They were introduced to deductive proof 
in Euclidean geometry in Form 3 and became quite proficient at it. Hilda and Jane’s Form 
4 mathematics teacher acquainted them with the Cabri computer environment and since 
then, they were treating it as part of their mathematics toolkit, using it to explore 
mathematics whenever they felt the need. We were researching students’ problem solving 
strategies with and without the use of computers, and decided to run regular after-school 
problem-solving workshops for Form 3 and Form 4 students on a voluntary basis in Hilda 
and Jane’s school. In the workshops, Cabri was introduced to students for the benefit of 
those who were not familiar with it, and subsequently students were asked to use it to 
solve some geometrical problems. Hilda and Jane joined the workshops, and they always 
worked together as a pair.  
 
One of the most difficult problems that was set in the workshops was the following: 
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Let ABCD be a quadrilateral such that each pair of interior opposite angles adds up 
to 180°. Find a way to prove that ABCD must be a cyclic quadrilateral.  
 
This is the converse of a theorem with which students were familiar and which they had 
already proved in their normal coursework. They were also familiar with this converse 
statement, although no proof had been given in the textbook or by their teacher. The 
‘traditional’ proof of this converse is by contradiction and it is for this reason that it is 
omitted in the textbook. In any case, it is important to note that the students had never 
experienced this type of proof.  
 
Hilda and Jane’s Proof 
Hilda and Jane worked on the problem using Cabri and the diagram for their solution is 
shown in Figure 1 along with their written proof. 
Figure 1 
Hilda and Jane's Cabri proof 
 
PROOF: 
Assume that for a quadrilateral with each pair of interior opposite 
angles adding up to 180°, the four vertices can be on different 
circles. 
From the diagram we see that it has a contradiction as the sum of 
the opposite angles of the blue quadrilateral (EBFD) is 360°, 
which is impossible.  
Therefore, for a quadrilateral with each pair of interior opposite 
angles adding up to 180°, the four vertices must be on the same 
circle. 
 
Postprint 
 13 
The Interview 
We interviewed Hilda and Jane after the workshops. The following is an excerpt from the 
interview. (H is Hilda, J is Jane, I1 and I2 were the interviewers.) 
 
1.  I1: Did you start with the quadrilateral or did you start with a circle? 
2.  J: To start we draw a quadrilateral. 
3. I1: So this quadrilateral is such that this angle plus this one makes 180, right? I 
can see you got ‘a’ marked here and (180 – a) here. 
4.  J: We assumed that the sum is 180. 
5. I1: When you say you assumed, in fact you drew any quad and then you just said 
we’ll assume this is 180-a. OK. What did you do then? 
6. H: Angle at centre is twice angle at circumference. We used this property to say 
that this angle is 2a and this one is 360-2a. 
7. I1: So before you did that presumably you first of all drew a circle through 3 of 
the points and then you did the same for these 3 points. 
8.  H: Yes. 
9.  I1: So then you marked these 2 centres. What did you say after that? 
10. H: Because the angle sum of a quadrilateral is 360 and these two (referring to 
∠ E and ∠ F) already add up to 360 so this is not possible. 
11. I2: So this is impossible. But do you think you have proved this? 
12. H: Not yet. 
13. I2: Why not yet? 
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14. H: Mmm…. When this point and the whole circle is moved to … then it is not a 
quadrilateral …. This one for example, if we move it up to here. 
15. I1: Actually I’m interested in the assumptions that you’re making. Because you 
started off by saying let’s assume that this angle and this one make 180, and you 
didn’t actually draw it like that. You drew any quadrilateral and you just marked 
these two adding up to 180. 
16. J: If I draw a quadrilateral with these two angles is 180, then if I draw a circle it 
goes through the 4 points. 
17. I1: Exactly. So this was a problem right? Is that what you did to begin with? Did 
you try to draw a quadrilateral that did have the opposite angles supplementary? 
18. J: No. We learned that theorem before. We knew already that it would give one 
circle so we didn’t think about drawing it. 
 
From Hilda and Jane’s written proof, the interview and our observation notes of their 
interaction with Cabri, we attempt to reconstruct the process they 
went through to reach their conclusion. For what follows, H & J 
stands for Hilda and Jane. 
 
Analysis of Hilda and Jane’s Proof 
H & J started their process of seeking a proof by insisting that any 
quadrilateral ABCD constructed in Cabri must satisfy the 
condition that each pair of opposite angles add up to o180 . They 
forced this assumption (presupposition) onto the Cabri world by 
Figure 2 
A wrongly labelled Cabri 
quadrilateral ABCD was 
drawn intentionally to 
force a visual perception 
that opposite angles add 
up to 180°. 
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marking the angles arbitrarily in a symbolic fashion (Figure 2). In other words, they 
deliberately drew a ‘wrong’ picture in Cabri and assumed that it is correct (lines 4, 5, 15).  
This tag-on labelling kept reminding them of the extra meaning that they gave to 
quadrilateral ABCD. In fact, this is simply equivalent to drawing a ‘sketch’ in paper-and-
pencil geometry. We should note that their use of the word ‘assume’ in this context is 
therefore quite different to the use in their written proof. In the first line of the written 
proof, the stated assumption is precisely the kind of statement needed to initiate a proof 
by contradiction in the traditional sense; that is, as a starting point from which to 
investigate the consequences of the assumption. Returning to their labelling in the Cabri 
diagram, H & J thus conjured up a biased Cabri world that existed as a kind of hybrid 
between their visual cognition and the actual Cabri environment1. 
              
H & J’s goal was to prove that such a quadrilateral ABCD must be cyclic. This goal 
motivated them to start to construct circles that would pass through the vertices of 
ABCD.  H & J knew from prior knowledge that a unique circle could be drawn through 
any three given points. They chose to construct circles C1 
(passing through A, B, D) with centre E and C2 (passing 
through B, D, C) with centre F, not expecting that circles 
C1 and C2 would coincide (lines 1-2, 7-9, see Figure 3). As 
a consequence of their forced presupposition, they 
observed, using a property of the circle that they were 
                                                          
1
 It is interesting to note that in a questionnaire on the advantages and disadvantages of using 
computer software in geometry, H commented that one of the disadvantages of DGE is that it 
‘cannot draw a wrong picture’.  
Figure 3 
Construction of circles C1 
and C2. 
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familiar with, that ∠ DEB = 2a and a2360  DFB −=∠ o  (line 6). As before, they labelled 
these two angles symbolically (see Figure 4). In doing so, H & J literally ‘saw’ that the 
sum of a pair of opposite interior angles in the (convex) quadrilateral EBFD equals o360  
(line 10). This, of course, contradicted the Euclidean property 
of a quadrilateral concerning the sum of its interior angles. H 
& J's forced presupposition resulted in an ‘impossible 
Euclidean quadrilateral’ EBFD. We call this  quadrilateral 
EBFD a pseudo-quadrilateral in H & J 's biased Cabri world. 
At this point, H & J concluded that if their forced 
presupposition were to result in a true Euclidean configuration, 
then A, B, C and D must lie on the same circle because otherwise, an impossibility would 
occur (see their written proof). However, when they were asked to revive their experience 
in reaching this conclusion during the interview, they were not completely convinced that 
they had proved what they wanted (lines 11-14). We try to 
speculate about their worries and delve further into their 
biased Cabri world. 
 
When C is being dragged sufficiently far inside the circle 
C1, the angle values 2a and a2360 −o  correspond to the 
exterior angles (instead of interior angles as depicted in 
Figure 4) ∠ DEB and ∠ DFB respectively (see Figure 5). During the session when H & J 
were trying to come up with a Cabri proof, we recall that this scenario made them 
uncomfortable due to the sudden “flip” of the quadrilateral EBFD. This flip resulted in 
Figure 5 
The "flipping" of quadrilateral 
EBFD. 
Figure 4 
Construction of an 
"impossible" 
quadrilateral EBFD. 
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the interior angles ∠ DEB and ∠ DFB, that give rise to the contradiction, becoming 
exterior angles, and the original convex quadrilateral EBFD became a re-entrant 
quadrilateral. It would not be difficult for H & J to figure out that the contradiction still 
holds in this case since: 
  
interior ∠ DEB  +  interior ∠ DFB = ( a2360 −o ) + 2a =   o360 . 
 
However, they did not consider this in their written proof. We speculate that this 
‘flipping’ produced some kind of visual uncertainty (or even a conflict) for H & J, which 
prevented them being fully convinced of their conclusion. This could have disturbed H & 
J and led them to doubt the validity of their construction. If they had put the two 
situations depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 together, and commented on the 
contradictions that these configurations entailed, they would have produced a complete 
formal proof by contradiction of the theorem. 
 
Conjecture-forming Activities 
Even though their written proof was not a complete one, H & J’s construction essentially 
captured the “validity” of the theorem. In retrospect, they did not really need the Cabri 
environment to arrive at the proof that they had produced. However, the Cabri world did 
inspire them to construct the pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD that acted as a visual guide, 
helping them to structure their geometrical reasoning. We could hence regard DGE as a 
catalytic agent that visually promotes transformational reasoning. This would motivate 
argumentative (conjecture-forming) dragging activities that foster insight and 
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understanding. In the following, we will suggest how such dragging activities could have 
taken place in H & J's situation. 
 
Figure 5 was not the only scenario that contributed to H & J’s uncertainty. H mentioned 
in the interview (Line 14) that when C is dragged to different positions, ABCD is no 
longer a quadrilateral and this prevented her being confident about her proof. However, it 
is exactly this aberration that could open up the situation from a specific consideration to 
a more general scenario.  
 
In Figure 6, we shade the pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD and hide the marked angles to 
make the diagrams more suggestive in the following discussion. In Case 1, quadrilateral 
ABCD is not convex whereas in Case 2 and Case 3, we cannot form a quadrilateral with 
A, B, C, D in this order. These cases contributed further to the visual conflict (a type of 
cognitive conflict) that H & J experienced and that hindered them from finalizing their 
proof. The situation in Case 1 could easily be dealt with since upon careful calculation, 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Figure 6 
The above cases show how the shape of the pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD changes as C is being 
dragged to different positions. 
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the contradiction ∠ DEB = 2a and a2360 DFB −=∠ o  continues to hold. Moreover, 
visually it seems obvious that A, B, C and D cannot lie on the same circle since a circle is 
a convex object while the quadrilateral ABCD here is not. Case 2 and Case 3 posit a new 
configuration for A, B, C and D which is the result of folding a convex quadrilateral 
ABCD along the diagonal BD. If we insist that the pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD possesses 
the same contradiction (i.e. ∠ DEB + ∠ DFB = o360 ) as before in these two cases, then 
the forced presupposition (assumption) for the biased Cabri world needs to be changed to 
∠DAB = ∠DCB instead of ∠DAB + ∠DCB = o180 . In fact, this new configuration is 
actually validating another familiar Euclidean theorem concerning concyclic points. 
Therefore, even in Case 2 and Case 3, we are essentially still in H & J’s biased Cabri 
world though the two forced presuppositions seem to be different on the surface. This 
dragging episode thus opens up intensive arguments on the plausible geometrical 
meanings that different positions of the dragged point C might entail. In particular, Case 
2 and Case 3 together seem to suggest a different theorem (conjecture). Furthermore, the  
pseudo- quadrilateral EBFD plays an important role in organizing the cognitive-visual 
process that would eventually lead to the acquisition and justification of an integrated 
theorem. EBFD is a visual object that measures the degree of anomaly of the biased Cabri 
world with respect to the different positions of  the vertices A, B, C and D. There are 
positions where the pseudo quadrilateral EBFD vanishes when a vertex of ABCD is 
being dragged. Figure 7 depicts a sequence of snapshots in a dragging episode when C is 
being dragged until EBFD vanishes. The last picture in the sequence shows that when C 
lies on the circumcircle C1 of A, B, and D, then E and F coincide. Furthermore, at this 
instance, o360 = DFB  + DEB ∠∠  (which has been a contradiction arising from the 
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pseudo- quadrilateral EBFD) is now a valid Euclidean statement. In fact, this condition 
holds only when C lies on C1. That is, when A, B, C and D are concyclic. We call C1 a 
locus of validity associated with the pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD. By this we mean the 
path that C traces out when it is being dragged intentionally to keep EBFD vanished, that 
is, maintaining the final configuration illustrated in Figure 7. This locus confines the 
types of configuration that A, B, C and D can assume under which the forced 
presupposition is valid.  
 
It seems reasonable (in the sense of Simon's transformational reasoning) to conclude 
from the above dynamic visual process that if pairs of opposite interior angles of a 
quadrilateral add up to o180 , then the quadrilateral is cyclic. The drag-until-vanish 
activity described above is an example of an intensive argumentative activity in DGE, in 
which a dual process of conjecture-forming and justification seems to take place.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Figure 7 depicts a sequence of snapshots in a dragging episode when C is being dragged until the 
pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD vanishes.  
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A SCHEME OF DYNAMIC THEOREM JUSTIFICATION AND ACQUISITION 
 
In the above analysis, we saw that the content of a formal proof by contradiction was 
essentially captured in an episode of ‘moving pictures’ in the Cabri world, driven by H & 
J. To what extent do we accept this dynamic construction as a kind of ‘picture proof’? 
Does this episode of ‘moving pictures’ constitute a figural concept that is a hybrid 
between inductive and deductive thinking? After experiencing a strategic dragging 
episode, how possible is it that the structure of a formal proof can emerge from the 
dynamic variation of some inter-dependent constructions in the Cabri world? The 
pseudo-quadrilateral in the biased Cabri world that H & J constructed seems to be the key 
artifact that gave the insight to H & J to form their Reductio ad Absurdum proof. We also 
saw how the dynamic variation of this pseudo-quadrilateral via dragging captured those 
locations where the imposed condition is Euclidean valid, and in turn suggested the 
geometrical theorem that was aimed to be proved. Thus the dual role that this pseudo- 
quadrilateral plays might bring about the cognitive unity of a theorem bridging the 
empirical-theoretical gap between inductive acquisition and formal justification (in 
particular, proof by contradiction) of a geometrical statement in DGE. We try to 
schematize the cognitive-visual process that composes this cognitive unity of a theorem 
in which a proof by contradiction could be ‘visualized’. We will put in parentheses the 
ideas and Cabri objects, that Hilda and Jane used, corresponding to the constructs in our 
scheme. 
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Suppose A is some type of geometrical configuration, e.g. a quadrilateral, in DGE. We 
begin by assuming that A (the quadrilateral ABCD) satisfies a certain condition C(A) 
(interior opposite angles are supplementary) and impose it on all geometrical 
configurations of type A in DGE. This forced presupposition evokes a kind of ‘mental 
labelling’ (the arbitrary labelling of ∠ DAB=2a and ∠ DCB=180-2a) in our minds which 
acts on DGE. The forced presupposition makes an object of type A in DGE biased with 
extra meaning. This biased DGE exists as a kind of hybrid state between the visual-true 
DGE (a virtual representation of the Euclidean world) and a pseudo-true interpretation, 
C(A), insisted on by us.  Depending on our disposition, an object depending on A can be 
constructed which inherits a local (i.e. depending on the location of the object) property 
that is not necessarily consistent with the Euclidean world because of C(A), hence 
resulting in a (local) contradiction. We call such an object associated with A in the biased 
DGE a pseudo object and denote it by O(A) (the quadrilateral EBFD). When part of A 
(the point C) is being dragged to different positions, O(A) might vanish (or degenerate, 
i.e., a plane figure to a line, a line to a point). The path or locus on which this happens 
gives a constraint under which the forced presupposition C(A) is Euclidean valid, i.e., 
where the biased microworld is being realized in the Euclidean world. We call this path 
the locus of validity of C(A) associated with O(A) (the circle C1). On the one hand, the 
locus of validity restricts A to certain special configurations resulting in A possessing a 
certain property which either we are trying to verify (prove) or are consequently led to 
discover (making conjecture). On the other hand, the essence of a formal proof by 
contradiction is encapsulated in the pseudo object O(A) and the locus of validity of C(A) 
associated with O(A) which convince us of the validity of a geometrical theorem. In 
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either case, these artifacts are potent with insight and understanding that could lead to 
both formulation of formal proofs and acquisition of theorems, and hence serve as visual 
tools for argumentative activities in the cognitive unity of a theorem (Figure 8). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Duality and Visualization 
We suggest from our analysis that an important feature in the above cognitive scheme is 
the critical dependence on the interaction between the person engaging in the 
mathematical task and DGE. In particular, the role of visualization is pivotal in the 
development of epistemic behaviour during the process that we described in the scheme. 
The construction of a pseudo object relies on the person’s visual interpretation of 
configurations in the biased microworld. The determination of the locus of validity is the  
 
result of episodes of intelligent dragging. In the person’s cognitive realm, there can exist 
a duality in interpreting the dynamic visual information simulated by the drag-mode. 
During any dragging episode, the boundary between exploring new geometrical 
situations and justifying a theorem is a blurred one. A pseudo object and its locus of 
validity could be instrumental in making a conjecture and proving the conjecture at the 
same time. The holistic nature of the dynamic visual representation in DGE allows 
variation in meaning when a DGE entity is observed (via dragging) from different points 
of view. Hence the dragging modality can be interpreted as a kind of “random access” to 
different cognitive modes (making conjecture, formulating proof) in the mind of the 
person who is interacting with DGE. This duality in interpretation in DGE is somewhat 
similar to Sfard’s (1991) discussion on the dual nature of mathematical conceptions, that 
is, the complementary unity between operational (process, algorithm) conception and 
structural (abstract object) conception of a mathematical entity. It facilitates the 
acquisition of deeper insight into the task at hand that could lead to further generalization.  
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A schematic flow on how the cognitive unity of a theorem could be broken down into different 
stages of argumentative activities in the context of seeking a proof by contradiction. 
Figure 8 
A, a type of geometrical 
configuration in DGE 
Impose condition C(A) 
on A 
A biased DGE loaded 
with a forced 
presupposition C(A) 
Construction of a pseudo 
object O(A) that inherits 
internal inconsistency 
Initial Argumentative Stage 
 
Construction of a biased 
dynamic geometry microworld 
Observation guided by 
geometrical intuition 
Second Argumentative Stage 
 
Construction of a pseudo object 
Discovery of a locus of 
validity associated with 
O(A) 
Employ the drag-until-
vanish strategy on O(A) 
Third Argumentative Stage 
 
Discovery of a locus of validity 
 
Final Argumentative Stage 
 
Make conjecture and/or organize 
a proof by contradiction 
 
Argumentative Stages of a  Proof by Contradiction in DGE 
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This kind of interaction between a person and DGE thus creates a web of meaning in 
which “the learners can draw upon and reconstruct (authors’ emphasis) for support – in  
ways that they choose as appropriate for their struggle to construct meaning for some 
mathematics.” (Noss & Hoyles, 1996, p.108)  
 
In light of the duality discussed above, instead of asking whether one can prove a 
geometrical theorem in DGE, perhaps the question should be how much content value of 
a traditional formal proof is being carried by the microworld in a particular construction-
dragging episode. By content we mean here the potentiality of the emergence (this 
happens in the person’s mind) of a formal proof structure. Appropriate and suggestive 
visual effects increase the magnitude of content value. For example, the drag-until-vanish 
Reductio ad Absurdum visualization procedure described in the scheme played an 
important role in realizing a proof. In this sense, the sequence of snapshots depicted in 
Figure 7 represents a potentiality that has a “high” content value. We might want to call 
such a visualization procedure a potential proof if our mind-set is on theorem 
justification. A traditional symbolic logical proof could then be an interpretation of such a 
visual potential proof. This opens up the question of equivalence between a visual 
potential proof in DGE and a formal Euclidean proof. To what extent do we accept a 
visual potential proof as a ‘proof’ in the traditional sense of the word? Is there a kind of 
visual logic system for DGE that is structurally isomorphic with a formal logical system 
on which the concept of a proof can be based? These are questions that deserve further 
investigation. Rather than addressing this problem of equivalence, let us recall the 
concept of visual theorems proposed by Davis: 
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“Briefly, a visual theorem is the graphical or visual output from a computer program – 
usually one of a family of such outputs – which the eye organizes into a coherent, 
identifiable whole and which is able to inspire mathematical questions of a traditional 
nature or which contributes in some way to our understanding or enrichment of some 
mathematical or real world situation.” (Davis, 1993, p.333) 
 
“It [visual theorem] is the passage from the mathematical iteration to the perceived figure 
grasped and intuited in all its stateable and unstateable visual complexities.” (Davis, 
1993, p.339) 
 
This idea of visual theorem agrees quite nicely with our visualization scheme in DGE that 
plays the role of argumentative activity in the theory of cognitive unity of a theorem. 
Using Resnick’s (1998) idea of abstract mathematical objects as positions in patterns and 
templates as concrete representations of patterns, we can think of our visualization 
scheme as a dynamic template and the computer environment as a vehicle that carries it. 
A special position resulting from a dragging episode when this dynamic template is 
activated represents an abstract geometrical object (a figural concept) and possibly a 
theorem associated with it. With this interpretation we can then think of constructions 
(e.g. a pseudo object) and their associated dragging modalities as means to discover these 
positions. For example, in the case studied above, points on a locus of validity (circle in 
this case) are positions in which a forced presupposition on a quadrilateral is Euclidean 
valid. These positions specify the general pattern of a quadrilateral into those locations 
we call cyclic quadrilaterals (a mathematical object) and at the same time, verifying a 
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theorem about such quadrilaterals. We could think of proof as meta-pattern finding 
among patterns. In DGE, these meta-patterns might emerge via intelligent construction 
and dragging by the engaging person. In H & J’s Reductio ad Absurdum proof, the 
behaviour of the pseudo-quadrilateral can be regarded as a meta-pattern that essentially 
captured a proof of a theorem concerning quadrilaterals. In this sense, a dynamic 
template constructed by a person engaging in a mathematical task is a kind of visualizer 
of abstract geometrical objects (figural concepts).  Interaction between the person and the 
DGE plays a key role in activating this visualizer to look for insight and understanding.  
Once a meta-pattern is recognized, it might then be possible to formulate a proof. We 
suggest that the idea of such a visualizer might be helpful to the understanding of proof in 
DGE and the construction of visualizers relevant to a geometrical problem may become a 
core pedagogical content of a dynamic geometry classroom. 
 
Implications for Further Research 
The cognitive-visual scheme on proof by contradiction in DGE that we have proposed 
was inspired by the work of a pair of students. In structuring it we have made a number 
of speculations on the cognitive processes that might have taken place in the students’ 
minds, especially when the pair of students were not able to articulate their reasoning in 
logically precise fashion. Even though the theoretical constructs in the scheme appear to 
be able to capture the essence of a geometrical proof by contradiction in a coherent way 
and open up a possible new type of geometrical reasoning in DGE, we still have to 
address the mathematical validity of this hypothetical proposal. An implication on the 
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nature of Euclidean geometry is the following question: What kind of theorem in 
Euclidean geometry can be written in the following form? 
 
If C(A) is assumed, then an O(A) can always be constructed such that there exists a locus 
of validity associated with O(A) on which O(A) degenerates and C(A) holds true. 
 
The existence of a locus of validity is the crucial determinant that fosters conjecture and 
justification. We do not know yet whether there is mathematical analysis that can 
guarantee its existence in a given geometrical situation. However, one thing we could 
certainly do is to apply the scheme for different geometrical theorems and test the 
feasibility of constructing these virtual geometrical objects in DGE. We hope that this 
line of research will produce more evidence on the validity of the proposed scheme. 
 
One of the aims of our work is to contextualize the theory of cognitive unity of theorems 
in DGE. We studied a pair of students’ behaviour on how they linked up their visual 
experience in DGE to construct a formal proof to a geometrical theorem. The 
hypothetical dynamic visualization model in DGE that we constructed to simulate their 
cognitive processes carries the idea of holistic figural concept with an inherited duality. 
This duality suggests a type of non-linear reasoning in contrast with the traditional linear 
deductive reasoning in a symbolic formal system: that is, depending on the disposition of 
the person interacting with DGE, a dragging activity can randomly access different facets 
of a geometrical scenario activating various logical modes (e.g. inductive, deductive). 
This opens up a new didactic discourse in the study of Euclidean geometry supported by 
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DGE. How should pedagogy be structured in order to nurture this type of non-linear 
figural reasoning that could bring about intensive argumentative activities in the 
cognitive unity of theorems in DGE? In the context of proof by contradiction, our 
proposed scheme suggests such a possible pedagogy. This work was motivated by a 
special case and there were only limited student data for us to work on. Further research 
in the applicability of the scheme in different didactic situations is needed to investigate 
the nature of this new discourse in DGE, and the extent to which this scheme can bridge 
the experimental-theoretical gap. 
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